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Upstream Effects of Generic Advertising:




Abstract   Muth’s model is adapted to determine the effects of generic advertis-
ing on upstream factor markets in a competitive industry where funds for
promotion are raised through a feed tax. Optimality conditions indicate that a
feed tax is an inferior funding mechanism. That is, the resulting promotion bud-
get, in general, is too small to maximize producer surplus at the farm level.
Applying the model to the U.S. catfish industry, results suggest that raising the
feed tax from $5 to $6 per ton is welfare increasing for farm, feed, and non-feed
sectors alike. Distributional analysis suggests that the processing sector cap-
tures most of the long-term benefits (51%), followed by the non-feed sector
(42%). Despite the feed sector’s modest share of total benefits (7%), owing to
tax shifting its long-run benefit-cost ratio (1.8:1) is favorable. Because feed and
non-feed inputs are gross substitutes, the feed tax generates a positive external-
ity for non-feed suppliers. Accounting for this externality raises the non-feed
sector’s net benefit by 36%. Overall, about one-half of the program’s long-term
net benefits accrue to input suppliers.
Key words   Dorfman-Steiner theorem, externalities, generic advertising, input
taxes, The Catfish Institute, upstream impacts.
Introduction
U.S. farmers currently spend about $1 billion per year on promotion activities de-
signed to strengthen demand in domestic and foreign markets (Forker and Ward
1993; Neff and Plato 1995). Moreover, the U.S. government supports these activities
with generous subsidies for non-price export promotion, as much as $230 million
per year over the last decade (Kinnucan and Ackerman 1995). Although substantial
scholarly effort has been devoted to determining farm-level impacts (for recent ex-
amples see Alston, Chalfant, and Piggott 2000; Chung and Kaiser 2000; and
Kinnucan and Miao 2000), and some attention has been given to (downstream) con-
sumer impacts (Alston 1995), the literature is silent on upstream impacts. In particu-
lar, if generic advertising increases the demand for farm commodities, as the litera-
ture suggests is the case in some instances, then it must also increase the demand for
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the inputs (e.g., feeds, fertilizers, pesticides, farm equipment) used to produce those
commodities. This suggests that benefit-cost analysis that focuses strictly on farm-
level impacts may understate benefits.
The purpose of this research is to determine the upstream impacts of generic ad-
vertising by focusing on the U.S. catfish industry as a case study. This is a useful
case study in that, unlike other commodities that raise funds for promotion via an
assessment on farm output (Armbruster and Frank 1988; Forker and Ward 1993), the
catfish industry raises its funds through a per-unit assessment (hereafter “tax”) on
feed.1 Thus, the promotion’s effect on the feed sector is of direct interest to feed
suppliers. In addition, the program’s effects on catfish demand and farm-level re-
turns have been documented in a series of econometric studies (see Kinnucan and
Miao 1999 and the references cited therein). A baseline exists, therefore, for com-
paring upstream impacts and assigning parameter values in the economic model.
The analysis begins with the specification of a Muth-type model similar to the
one used by Wohlgenant (1993) to analyze research and promotion effects in the
U.S. beef and pork industries. The model is solved for the derived demand curves
for feed and non-feed inputs to determine how the tax and promotion affect input
demand. Optimality conditions implied by the model are used to determine whether
the tax is too high or low, and to determine whether budget allocations are efficient.
The model is then simulated to determine the sector-wide impacts of a simultaneous
increase in the tax and promotion. The paper concludes with a summary of the key
findings.
Model
Consider a situation where a competitive industry combines a feed input, F, with a
bundle of non-feed inputs, K, to produce a farm product, Q, under conditions of con-
stant returns to scale (CRTS). A tax of T dollars per unit is imposed on feed to raise
funds to promote the farm product. The feed and non-feed sectors are competitive,
and producers in all sectors maximize profit. The domestic market accounts for a
sufficiently large portion of domestic production so that trade can be ignored, at
least as a first approximation.
With these assumptions, the structural model that defines initial equilibrium is:
Q = D(P, M, NM) (demand for Q) (1)
Q = f(F, K) (production function) (2)
PF = QF P (first-order condition for factor F) (3)
PK = QK P (first-order condition for factor K) (4)
PF = g(F) + T (supply of F) (5)
1 The choice of feed as the collection point rather than farm output was due to two factors (Gantz 2001).
First, when the program was started in 1987, only two feed mills were operating, and thus this was
deemed the “easiest route to collect dues.” Second, fish sold through live-haul operations would be dif-
ficult to assess, as would fingerling production. By taxing feed, this helped to ensure that all industry
segments that benefited from the program also contributed.Upstream Effects of Generic Advertising 85
PK = h(K) (supply of K) (6)
A = T F (tax receipts = promotion budget) (7)
M = ψ  A (budget allocation to media promotion) (8)
NM = (1 – ψ ) A (budget allocation to non-media promotion) (9)
where QF (= ∂ Q/∂ F) and QK = (∂ Q/∂ K) are F and K’s marginal products, and the remain-
ing variables are as defined in table 1. The model represented by equations (1) – (9) is
identical in form to Muth’s (1965) model. It differs from Wohlgenant’s (1993)
model in that the promotion budget and expenditures are treated as endogenous, and
the marketing channel is ignored; i.e., the promotion variables are specified in the
derived demand relationship [equation (1)] rather than in a retail demand relation-
ship. This implies that a promotion-induced shift in retail demand results in the
same shift at the farm level, an assumption that is valid as long as the price of mar-
keting services is exogenous (Kinnucan 2001), a maintained hypothesis in
Wohlgenant’s (1993) analysis.
Table 1
Baseline Data and Model Parameters, U.S. Catfish Industry, 1997–99
Item Definition Value
P Farm price, $/lb. 0.73 a
Q Farm quantity, 1,000 tons 843 a
V Farm value (= PQ), million $ 1,236
PF Feed price, $/ton 230 b
F Feed quantity, 1,000 tons 2,375 b
R Feed value (= PFF), million $ 546
SF Feed cost share (= R/V) 0.44
SK Non-feed cost share (= 1 – SF) 0.56
T Feed tax, $/ton 5.00 c
τ F Feed tax rate (= T/PF) 0.022
A Promotion budget ( = TF), million $ 11.9
M Media advertising expenditure 6.26 c
ψ Media share (= M/A) 0.53
µ Media-Non-media ratio [=ψ /(1 – ψ )] 1.11
θ Promotion intensity (= A/V) 0.0096
β M Media advertising elasticity 0.0150 d
β NM Non-media elasticity 0.0150, 0.0075, or 0
η Farm-level demand elasticity (absolute value) 0.45 d
σ Factor substitution elasticity 2.83 b
ε Q Farm supply elasticity 0.73 e
ε F Supply elasticity for catfish feed 1.58 b
ε K Supply elasticity for non-feed inputs 0.26 f
a USDA, ERS (2000).
b Ligeon (2000).
c Gantz (2000).
d Kinnucan and Miao (1999), see text for details.
e Zidack, Kinnucan, and Hatch (1992).
f Derived from the farm supply elasticity. See text for details.Kinnucan and Paudel 86
The model is expressed in percentage changes as follows:
Q* = –η P* + β MM* + β NMNM* (1′ )
Q* = SFF* + SKK* (2′ )
P F
* = – (SK/σ ) F* + (SK/σ ) K* + P* (3′ )
P K
* = (SF/σ ) F* – (SF/σ ) K* + P* (4′ )
P F
* = (1/ε F) F* + τ FT* (5′ )
P K
* = (1/ε K) K* (6′ )
A* = T* + F* (7′ )
M* = ψ * + A* (8′ )
NM* = – µψ * + A* (9′ )
where the asterisked variables indicate relative change (e.g., Q* = dQ/Q), and the pa-
rameters are as defined in table 1. (Note: all parameters, including the demand elas-
ticity, are defined to be positive.) The model consists of nine endogenous variables
(P, Q, PF, F, PK, K, A, M, and NM), and two exogenous variables (T and ψ ). T deter-
mines the budget size and is under feed suppliers’ (collective) control; ψ  determines
the budget allocation and is under the program manager’s control.
The model represented by equations (1′ ) – (9′ ) provides a local approximation
to unknown functions. The approximation is linear in relative changes and elastici-
ties, but does not require that the elasticities be constant. In particular, quoting from
Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995, p. 256, footnote 35), “it is perfectly valid to use
this type of model to analyze the effects of parallel shifts in the case of linear supply
and demand functions,” even though the elasticities along such functions change.
Although the model imposes no restrictions on the functional forms of the underly-
ing structural relationships, equilibrium displacements should be kept small to mini-
mize approximation error, as the approximation is local.2
The effects of the tax and promotion on feed demand are determined by drop-
ping equations (5′ ) and (7′ ) (since we want to treat PF and A as temporarily exog-
enous), and solving the remaining equations simultaneously for F*.3 The effects on
non-feed demand are determined in a similar fashion by deleting equation (6′ ) in-
2 In the present study, equilibrium displacements contemplated are on the order of 1% or less. For ex-
ample, the vertical shift in the farm-level demand curve associated with an increase in media advertising
is equal to α  = (β M/η ) M*. Setting β M = 0.015, η  = 0.45, and M* = 0.20, parameter values used later in
the analysis yields α  = 0.0066. This means that a 20% increase in media advertising will cause the de-
mand curve to shift vertically from its initial equilibrium point by a mere 0.66%. (The horizontal shift is
even less; i.e., β M M* = 0.015 (0.20) = 0.0030, or 0.30%.) A similar result applies to the supply shifts
associated with the feed tax.
3 Prior to equation (10)’s derivation, we replaced equation (1’) with Q* = –η P* + β M M* + β NM NM* – τ F
SF η  T*, the demand curve for Q when farmers bear the tax’s full incidence, as is the case when feed
supply is perfectly elastic. T*’s coefficient in this expression is derived as follows. First, let the inverse
demand function (ignoring promotion) be P = D(Q) – T. Totally differentiating this expression and con-
verting to percentage changes yields P* = –(1/η )Q* - τ QT* where τ Q = T/P. To express τ Q in terms of the
feed tax rate, let T = τ FPF. Then, τ Q = τ FPF/P, which implies τ Q = SFτ F if F and Q are suitably scaled so
that one unit of F equals one unit of Q. Substituting SFτ F into the inverse demand curve gives P* = –(1/
η ) Q* – SFτ FT*, which yields the Q-dependent relation Q* = –η P* – τ FSFη T*.Upstream Effects of Generic Advertising 87
stead of equation (5′ ) and solving for K*. Following this procedure the derived de-
mand curves for the feed and non-feed inputs are:
FD P D A KF M N M K * ( ) ( )( ) ** =− + [] ++ + [] ελ σ η β β ε σ (10)
+− + [] −+ [] () ( ) ( ) ** βµ β εσψτ η εσ MN M K F F K DS D T
KD P D A FK M N M F
** * () () ( ) =− + ′ [] ++ + ′ [] ελ σ η β β ε σ (11)
+− + ′ [] −− [] ′ {} () ( ) ( ) ** βµ β εσψ τ ε η σ MN M F F F F DS D T
where λ  = (SFη  + SKσ ) > 0 is the Allen market elasticity of derived demand
(Bronfenbrenner 1961), D = (ε K + SFσ  + SKη ) > 0, and D’ = (ε F + λ ) > 0. A*’s coeffi-
cient in equation (10) and equation (11) is positive in sign, which means an increase
in advertising expenditure increases the derived demand for both inputs, as ex-
pected. Similarly, ψ *’s coefficient in both equations has an uncertain sign, as ex-
pected, since a diversion of funds from non-media to media promotion may be coun-
terproductive, depending on the relative effectiveness of the two promotion instru-
ments.
The interesting results are for the tax effect, where T*’s coefficient is negative in
equation (10), but uncertain in equation (11). In particular, an increase in the feed tax
increases the demand for non-feed inputs if σ  > η ; the reverse is true if σ  < η . The rea-
son is that when σ  > η , F and K are gross substitutes (Alston and Scobie 1983).
Thus, in this case a tax-induced increase in the price of F increases the demand for
K. If σ  < η , F and K are gross complements, and a tax-induced increase in PF de-
creases the demand for K. Thus, the feed tax may generate a positive or negative ex-
ternality for non-feed suppliers depending on the relative magnitudes of σ  and η .
The feed tax’s effect on farm supply is determined by dropping equation (1′ ) to
treat P as temporarily exogenous and solving equations (2′ ) - (6′ ) simultaneously for
Q* to yield:
Qe D P S T FK FFF K
** * () ( ) =+ ′′ [] −+ [] εε σ τ ε ε σ (12)
where e = (SF ε F + SK ε K) > 0 and D″  = (SF ε K + SK ε F + σ ) > 0. Since P*’s coefficient
is positive for normal parameter values, the farm supply curve is upward sloping, as
expected. Also, T*’s coefficient is negative, which means an increase in the feed tax
causes the farm supply curve to shift to the left, as expected.
T*’s coefficient measures the horizontal shift in the curve; i.e., the shift in the
quantity direction when P* = 0. To compare this shift with the shift in the feed sup-
ply curve as given in equation (5′ ), it is necessary to measure the vertical shift; i.e., the
shift in the price direction when Q* = 0. For this purpose, denote P*’s coefficient as:
εε ε σε ε σ QF K F K K F eS S =+ + + () ( )
where ε Q is the farm supply elasticity. Then, equation (12) may be written in inverse
form as:
PQ T QF
** * () =+ 1 ετ Ω (12′ )
where Ω  = SF ε F (ε K + σ )/(ε F ε K + σ e) is an incidence parameter that is bounded on
the unit interval. In particular, if feed supply is perfectly inelastic (ε F = 0), feed sup-Kinnucan and Paudel 88
pliers bear the tax’s full burden and farmers’ incidence is zero (Ω  = 0). In this case,
the farm supply curve is unaffected by the feed tax.
Conversely, if feed supply is perfectly elastic (ε F = ∞ ), then Ω  = (SF ε K + SF σ )/
(ε K + SF σ ) < 1 and the farm supply curve shifts up, but by less than the feed supply
curve. The same is true if farm technology is Leontief (σ  = 0), in which case the
shift is proportional to the feed cost share; i.e., Ω  = SF. Pass-through is complete
(Ω  = 1) when ε K = 0, in which case the farm supply curve shifts by the same per-
centage amount as the feed supply curve; i.e., T*’s coefficient in equations (5′ ) and
(12′ ) is identical. The upshot is that tax shifting depends on supply conditions in
both input markets, not just the feed market. Specifically, in the usual case where
the feed supply curve is upward sloping (rather than vertical), farmers’ incidence is
maximal, ceteris paribus, when ε K = 0. (This discussion of incidence is incomplete
in that farm price is assumed to be exogenous (η  = ∞ ). A complete analysis is pro-
vided in the appendix.)
Optimality Conditions
Optimal Feed Tax Rate
The optimal feed tax is obtained by invoking the following condition developed by
Alston, Carman and Chalfant (ACC) (1994, p. 157):
… a check-off will be optimized when an increase in the check-off yields an
additional vertical shift in demand of the same amount per unit so that, at the
margin, the combined advertising and check-off will have no net effect on
quantity and ∂ q/∂ t = 0.
To apply ACC’s condition, it is necessary to derive the reduced-form equation for
feed quantity. For this purpose, we rewrite the derived demand equation for feed as
follows:
FP A FF F
** * =− + ηβ (10′ )
where η F = (ε K λ  + ση )/D is the “total” demand elasticity for feed, and β F = (β M +
β NM)(ε K + σ )/D is the “total” promotion elasticity. Equation (10′ ) is identical to equa-
tion (10) except that the tax term is dropped to prevent double counting of the tax
effect,4 and ψ * is set to zero since we want to isolate the tax effect.
Substituting equations (5′ ) and (7′ ) (to endogenize the budget) into equation
(10′ ) and solving for F* yields:
F* = [ε F (β F – τ F η F )/Θ ] T* (13)
where Θ  = [ε F (1 – β F) + η F] > 0. Equation (13) indicates the net relationship be-
tween the feed tax and feed quantity; i.e., the relationship that takes into account the
own-price effect of an increase in the tax, and the induced advertising expenditure.
Since advertising and the tax have opposite effects on feed demand, it is not surpris-
ing that T*’s coefficient in equation (13) is uncertain. In particular, for the reduced-
4 Double-counting arises because equation (10’) is based on the assumption that the entire tax is shifted
to farmers (see footnote 3). Since farmers do not bear the full incidence when the feed supply curve is
upward sloping, the tax-burdened demand curve no longer applies. Thus, the tax term in equation (10) is
deleted prior to solving for the reduced form.Upstream Effects of Generic Advertising 89
form elasticity F*/T* = ε F (β F – τ F η F )/Θ  to be positive, the advertising effect must
be larger than the tax effect, i.e., β F > τ F η F. [More precisely, the vertical shift in the
feed demand curve (= β F/η F) must exceed the vertical shift in the feed supply curve
(= τ F).]
As ACC note, the tax should be increased to the point where the combined ef-
fects of the advertising and the tax just cancel and F*/T* = 0. Imposing this condition
on equation (13) yields:
 τ β η FF F =  (14)
where  τ F is the feed tax rate  () = TP F  that maximizes producer surplus in the feed
sector. From equation (14), the optimal tax rate increases as advertising becomes
more effective (larger β F) and as feed demand becomes less price elastic (smaller
η F). By way of comparison, ACC’s results for the optimal output tax rate is:
 τ β η Q =  (15)
where  τ Q TP =  is the tax rate on farm output that maximizes producer surplus at
the farm level. Thus, the optimal tax rate at both market levels is governed by the
same basic forces, namely consumer sensitivity to promotion and price.
Although equations (14) and (15) are isomorphic, the tax rate that is optimal for
feed suppliers in general differs from the tax rate that is optimal for farmers. To see
under what conditions the optimal tax rates are identical, consider equation (14)’s
expanded form:
 + + τβ ε σ ε λ σ η FK K = ( )( ) (14′ )
where β  = β  M + β  NM. Setting equation (14′ ) = equation (15) yields:
ττ η λη σ FQ =⇒ = ⇒ = .
From the above condition, the optimal tax rates are equivalent at each market level
if primary and derived demands are equally elastic (η  = λ ), which implies η  = σ .
More generally:
ττ η λ FQ <> <> as (16)
i.e., the optimal feed tax rate exceeds the optimal output tax rate if output demand is
more price elastic than feed demand. The reverse is true if output demand is less
price elastic than feed demand. In the special case where farm technology is
Leontief (σ  = 0), equation (14′ ) reduces to:
′ == − τβ η τ FF F Q SS () 1 (14′′ )
i.e., the optimal feed tax exceeds the optimal output tax by the inverse of the feed
cost share. Condition (14′′ ) sets the upper limit on the feed tax rate. That is, feed
suppliers’ incentive to promote is maximized when σ  = 0.
Returning to equation (14′ ), there is another situation where the optimal tax
rates at the two market levels are equivalent, namely when ε K = 0. The reason for
this, as discussed earlier, is that in this instance farmers’ incidence of the feed tax isKinnucan and Paudel 90
maximal, which attenuates farmers’ incentive to promote vis-à-vis feed mills. This
highlights the importance of considering supply conditions in both factor markets
when evaluating promotion incentives.
Optimal Advertising Intensity
Dorfman and Steiner (1954) showed that a monopoly’s incentive to promote (hold-
ing output constant) can be stated as follows:
θβ η DS − = (17)
where  θ DS −  (= A/PQ) is optimal advertising “intensity” (advertising expenditure di-
vided by industry revenue) in profit-maximizing equilibrium. As noted by ACC (p.
160), since equations (15) and (17) are identical, a competitive industry has the
same incentive to promote as a monopoly (or industry cartel) with fixed output.
Moreover, the optimal output tax rate also indicates optimal intensity, i.e.,
θτβ η QQ == (18)
where  θ Q (= A/PQ) is optimal intensity for a competitive industry that raises funds
for promotion through an output tax.
An analogue to equation (18) can be developed for a feed tax by multiplying  τ F
by  FF  to yield:
τ FF F TF P F TF S PQ == .
Substituting A = TF into the above relation yields  τ F = A/(SFPQ), which implies:
θτ FF F S = (19)
where  θ F  (= A/PQ) is optimal advertising intensity corresponding to a feed tax.
From equation (14′′ )  τ F attains its maximal value when  ′ = − ττ FF Q S 1 , i.e.,  θτ FQ = .
Thus,
θθ θ QD SF =≥ − (20)
optimal intensity under a feed tax is never higher than optimal intensity under an
output tax. This result is summarized in the following theorem:
THEOREM: The Dorfman-Steiner theorem sets the upper limit on the optimal ad-
vertising intensity implied by a feed tax. As a consequence, from the farmer’s per-
spective a feed tax in general is sub-optimal.
As noted by a reviewer, this theorem is consistent with the principle that, “it is
always superior to tax the item that is having the effect”—in this case the output that
is being advertised. By way of analogy, in the environmental literature where an in-
put (e.g., fertilizer) is causing a pollution problem, it is generally more efficient to
tax that input rather than industry output, or another input (see Larson, Helfand, and
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higher tax rate to achieve the same level of pollution reduction as a direct tax on the
offending input, or a tax on output. In essence, in the case of generic advertising, an
input tax permits untaxed inputs to free ride, which explains, in part, why the budget
is sub-optimal from the farmer’s perspective.
Optimal Budget Allocation
A fixed promotion budget is allocated optimally when the last dollar spent on each
promotion instrument yields an identical increase in industry revenue. From the feed
suppliers’ perspective, this equimarginal principle may be stated as follows:
dR/dM = dR/dNM
where R = PF F. By the product rule:
PF (dF/dM) + F (dPF/dM) = PF (dF/dNM) + F (dPF/dNM),
which may be expressed in elasticity form as:
(PF F/M) (F*/M* + PF
*/M*) = (PF F/NM) (F*/NM* + PF
*/NM*).
Dividing this expression through by PF F and substituting equations (8′ ) and (9′ )
(noting that A* = 0 since the budget is fixed) yields:
(F*/ψ * + PF
*/ψ *) = – (F*/ψ * + PF
*/ψ *)
or, equivalently,
F*/ψ * + PF
*/ψ * = 0.
Thus, the budget allocation is optimal when an increase in ψ  (=M/A) has no net ef-
fect on feed quantity and price at the margin. Since the quantity effect is simply the
price effect scaled by the supply elasticity; i.e., F*/ψ * = ε F (PF
*/ψ *), the optimality
condition reduces to:
PF
*/ψ * = 0. (21)
That is, the allocation is optimized when the last dollar diverted from non-media to
media promotion has no net effect on the feed price.
To implement condition (21), it is necessary to derive the reduced-form equa-
tion for feed price. To accomplish this, we set T* = A* = 0 and substitute equation
(10) into equation (5′ ) to yield:
P FM N M F F
** () ( ) =− + [] βµ β εη ψ Φ (22)
where Φ  = (ε K + σ )/D. Imposing restriction (21) on (22) and solving for µ  yields:
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where µ  is the ratio of media to non-media expenditures that maximizes producer
surplus in the feed sector. Substituting equations (8) and (9) into this expression
yields an equivalent condition in terms of budget share:
ψββ β =+ MM N M () . (23)
From equation (23), the optimal budget allocation depends strictly on the promotion
elasticities. If consumers are equally responsive to the instruments such that β M =
β NM, the budget is divided evenly. Conversely, if non-media promotion is ineffectual,
such that β NM = 0, the entire budget goes to media advertising. Condition (23) is
identical to the condition derived by Kinnucan and Thomas (1997, pp. 428–29)
when the goal is to maximize producer surplus at the farm level. Thus, the budget
allocation that is optimal for feed suppliers is also optimal for farmers.
Application to U.S. Catfish Industry
To indicate the model’s empirical utility, and to highlight principles, we apply it to
the U.S. catfish industry. Three issues are addressed: (i) is the current feed tax of $5
per ton optimal? (ii) is the current budget allocation of 53% to media advertising ef-
ficient? and (iii) how are the program’s benefits and costs distributed among indus-
try segments? Since trade in catfish products represents less than 2% of industry
output (USDA/ERS 2000), and evidence against competitive pricing is weak (Kouka
1995), these assumptions underlying the model appear to be approximated in this in-
stance. As for CRTS, one may question this assumption, since farm technology is
heterogeneous. However, this assumption is properly interpreted as applying to the
aggregate production function. As noted by Diewert (1981), aggregate technology
may exhibit CRTS, even though firm-specific technologies do not.5
Parameterization
Baseline values for prices, quantities, cost shares, and the tax rate correspond to
1997–99, a period sufficiently long to represent complete adjustment to a one-time
permanent change in the tax and the accompanying promotion expenditure. Elastic-
ity values are drawn from the literature. Since it is necessary to measure the demand
elasticity at the farm-level, we multiplied Kinnucan and Miao’s (1999) estimate of
the wholesale-level demand elasticity (0.71) by their estimate of the farm-wholesale
price transmission elasticity (0.63) to get η  = 0.45.
The media promotion elasticity is set to β M = 0.0150, an expenditure-share
weighted average of the media-specific elasticities estimated by Kinnucan and Miao
(1999). No estimates exist for consumer responses to non-media promotion, which
consists chiefly of public relations and food-service training (Gantz 2000). Accordingly,
we entertain three scenarios: (1) media and non-media promotion are equally effec-
tive (β NM = 0.0150), (2) non-media promotion is half as effective as media promo-
5 A reviewer questioned how results would be affected if the catfish industry exhibited increasing returns
to scale (IRTS). Addressing this issue, Nerlove and Waugh (1961, pp. 834–35) found that IRTS (caused
by external economies) reduces optimal advertising intensity. The reason is that under external econo-
mies, the industry’s long-run supply curve is downward-sloping, which implies a weaker price effect
than if the supply curve were flat or upward sloping. Although IRTS cannot be ruled out for catfish, re-
search suggests that when land quality is accounted for, and the home dwelling is treated as an output,
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tion (β NM = 0.0075), and (3) non-media promotion is ineffectual (β NM = 0). Scenario
3 is probably overly pessimistic given that non-media promotion’s budget share is
47%. As such, scenario 3 provides a lower-bound estimate of program impact.6
Based on recent econometric work by Ligeon (2000), the substitution and feed
supply elasticities are set to σ  = 2.83 and ε F = 1.58. No estimates exist for ε K. Ac-
cordingly, this parameter was derived from the expression for the farm-supply elas-
ticity given earlier, namely:
ε












Setting ε Q = 0.73, Zidack, Kinnucan and Hatch’s (1992) estimate of this parameter’s
long-run value, and inserting values for the remaining parameters from table 1,
yields ε K = 0.26. This implies that non-feed inputs are inelastically supplied, which
is intuitive given the highly specialized nature of inputs (e.g., aeration, feeding, and
harvesting equipment) used in catfish production.
The remaining parameter values are computed from industry statistics (see table
1’s footnotes for sources). In particular, the feed cost share is set to SF = 0.44, which
implies a non-feed cost share of SK = 0.56. Based on an average feed price of $230
per ton, the $5 per ton feed tax implies a tax rate of 2.2%; i.e., τ F = 0.022. Dividing
the media expenditure ($6.26 million) by the promotion budget ($11.9 million)
yields a media budget share of 53%; i.e., ψ  = 0.53. Accordingly, the ratio of media
to non-media expenditures is µ  = 1.11. Dividing the promotion budget by farm rev-
enue ($1.24 billion) gives a promotion intensity of θ  = 0.0096. Thus, the feed tax
generates a promotion budget equal to about 1% of farm revenue. By way of com-
parison, generic advertising intensities for the 34 California crops listed in Alston,
Carman, and Chalfant’s analysis (1994, p. 161) range from 0.04% (dairy) to 5.79%
(raisins) for a median intensity of 1.13% (eggs).
Optimal Intensity and Budget Allocation
The optimal intensity and budget allocation consistent with the foregoing param-
eters are given in table 2. To determine sensitivity, and to highlight the principle that
returns to promotion increase as demand becomes less price elastic, alternative val-
ues for σ  are considered. Specifically, we set σ  = 1, which implies a Cobb-Douglas
farm technology, and σ  = η  = 0.45, which implies that primary and derived demands
are equally elastic. To highlight the theorem’s implications, and to determine the ex-
tent to which the budget might need to be increased to maximize farmers’ welfare,
we computed the optimal intensity corresponding to a production tax as well as the
feed tax.
Focusing first on optimal intensity, results suggests that the promotion budget is
6 Alternatively, scenario 3 could be interpreted as reflecting general equilibrium effects. Specifically, as
noted by a reviewer, the present study does not take explicit account of substitution effects at retail, nor
does it consider strategic advertising responses, either of which could dilute campaign impact. For ex-
ample, if catfish advertising causes consumers to substitute catfish for poultry, there could be a net loss
in the demand for feed, since poultry requires less feed per unit than catfish. In this case, benefits to
feed suppliers (broadly defined) would be overstated. Similarly, if poultry producers, such as Tyson, re-
spond to increased catfish advertising by intensifying their own advertising, the net effect of the catfish
campaign would be reduced. Although studies suggest substitution effects at retail are weak (see
Kinnucan and Miao 1999), little is known about strategic responses. With this in mind, scenario 3 would
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too small, even from the feed mills’ perspective. In particular, optimal intensity cor-
responding to the feed tax ranges from 0.012 to 0.029, which is above the actual in-
tensity of 0.010. If one rejects the notion that non-media promotion is ineffectual,
the lower-bound intensity is 0.018, 1.8 times the actual intensity. For the production
tax, the optimal intensity is 2.3 to 2.8 times higher than the values just indicated,
which underscores the theorem. Clearly, from the farmer’s perspective the feed tax
is an inferior funding mechanism.
Results are robust to σ  but relatively sensitive to β NM. For example, holding β NM
constant at 0.0150, a reduction in σ  from 2.83 to 1.00 (65% cut) causes the feed tax
optimal intensity to increase from 0.023 to 0.026 (13% increase). Similarly, holding
σ  constant at 2.83, a reduction in β NM from 0.0150 to 0.0075 (50% cut) causes opti-
mal intensity to decline from 0.023 to 0.018 (22% cut). If σ  = η  = 0.45 and β NM =
0.0075, the optimal intensity is 5.0% for the production tax and 2.2% for the feed
tax, which again underscores the theorem. Even in the pessimistic scenario where
non-media promotion is ineffectual (β NM = 0), the optimal intensity corresponding to
the feed tax for baseline parameter values is θ F = 0.012, 20% above the actual rate.
θ F ’s average value for the nine simulations in table 2 is 0.020, which suggests
that to maximize producer welfare in the feed sector, the feed tax would need to be
doubled. Similarly,  θ Q’s average value is 0.050, which suggests that the optimal in-
tensity from the farmer’s perspective is 5%, five times the actual intensity, and more
than double the feed suppliers’ optimal intensity. Given free-rider incentives associ-
ated with collective action (Hardin 1982), there is little expectation that feed suppli-
Table 2
Optimal Promotion Intensity and Budget Allocation, U.S. Catfish Industry, 1997–99
Optimal Intensitya
With Production With Feed Optimal Budget
Item Tax  () θ Q Tax  () θ F Ratio Allocation () ψ b
σ  = 2.83 (baseline)
β NM = 0.0150 0.0667 0.0235 2.84 0.50
β NM = 0.0075 0.0500 0.0176 2.84 0.67
β NM = 0.0000 0.0333 0.0117 2.84 1.00
σ  = 1.00
β NM = 0.0150 0.0667 0.0257 2.59 0.50
β NM = 0.0075 0.0500 0.0193 2.59 0.67
β NM = 0.0000 0.0333 0.0129 2.59 1.00
σ  = η  = 0.45
β NM = 0.0150 0.0667 0.0293 2.27 0.50
β NM = 0.0075 0.0500 0.0220 2.27 0.67
β NM = 0.0000 0.0333 0.0147 2.27 1.00
Average 0.0500 0.0196 2.55 0.72
Actual 0.0096 0.0096 1.00 0.53
Average/actual 5.21 2.04 2.55 1.36
a Computed using text equations (18) and (19).
b Computed using text equation (23).Upstream Effects of Generic Advertising 95
ers would agree to the funding increases necessary to maximize their own welfare,
let alone farmers’ welfare.7 However, given the degree of under-funding suggested
by table 2, it appears that even modest increases in the tax rate could yield signifi-
cant benefits at the margin for both groups.
As for budget allocation, media advertising’s optimal share ranges from 0.50 to
1.00, depending on the effectiveness of non-media promotion. The extreme values
correspond to scenarios 1 and 3, the latter of which is probably unrealistic. The av-
erage for the three scenarios is 0.72, which is 36% above the actual media share of
0.53. Since optimal budget allocations are determined strictly by promotion elastici-
ties, the near-even budget split indicates that program managers implicitly assume
that media and non-media promotion are about equally effective; i.e., β NM ≈  β M,
a hypothesis that needs to be tested.
Returning to intensity, it may be of interest to know how low the effectiveness
parameter β  = β M + β NM can go before the current level of funding is deemed to high.
To determine that, we computed a “breakeven” effectiveness parameter for farmers
and feed mills by setting equations (18) and (19) equal to the observed intensity, and
solving for β  with the remaining parameters set to the baseline values given in table
1. This procedure yielded a breakeven parameter of β Q = 0.0043 for farmers and
β F = 0.0123 for feed mills. Comparing these estimates with the lower-bound value
of β LB = 0.0150 used in this study, and taking into account the opportunity cost of
promotion funds and general equilibrium effects (see footnote 6), one might argue
that from the feed mills’ perspective, the current intensity is about right. But this ar-
gument would be much harder to make from the farmer’s perspective, as the
breakeven effectiveness parameter in this instance is substantially below the lower-
bound estimate, namely β Q/β LB = 0.29.
Reduced-Form Elasticities
The analysis thus far suggests the current feed tax of $5 per ton is sub-optimal for
farmers and feed suppliers alike. Yet some mill operators question whether they
would be better off without the tax. To gain insight into this issue, and to indicate
the quantitative effects of the tax/promotion scheme on all industry participants, in-
cluding non-feed suppliers, we computed the model’s reduced-form elasticities as
indicated in table 3.
Focusing first on T*, all elasticities pertaining to quantity effects are positive, a
necessary condition for an increase in the tax to be welfare increasing at the margin.
Also, the price effects are uniformly positive as expected, since the quantity effects
are positive. Even under scenario 3 the elasticities remain positive, which suggests
media promotion is sufficiently profitable to carry the entire program.
The coefficients for A*/T* range from 1.00 to 1.02, which suggests that a 10%
increase in the tax would increase the promotion budget by at most 10.2%. Thus,
treating advertising expenditure as exogenous, as in previous studies (Kinnucan and
7 The basis for this statement is the well-known tendency for collective goods to be under-provided. This
is implicit in Nerlove and Waugh’s statement (1961, p. 820), “Since payments must generally be ap-
proved by a majority of producers, rates must be kept low enough to attract majority support. Any purely
economic theory of cooperative advertising can thus set only an upper bound to optimal expenditures
(emphasis added).” Although the catfish program enjoys 100% participation by feed mills (thanks to a
reduced tax rate, see footnote 8), there is still a free-rider problem in that there is little incentive for
inframarginal feed mills to indicate their true willingness to pay, as this will affect the assessment rate,
but not their ability to participate in benefits. The larger issue of how heterogeneity in industry structure
might affect the optimal location of the tax in the marketing channel is beyond the scope of the present
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Miao 1999), is innocuous in that the induced budget enlargement is minuscule.
To address whether the tax is advantageous for feed suppliers, consider an in-
crease in the tax to $6 per ton, the level that existed prior to 1995.8 The net effect on
feed price is determined by multiplying the coefficients for PF
*/T* in table 3 by 20%,
as indicated in table 4. Results show the feed price increasing by between $1.10 and
$1.59, depending on the effectiveness of non-media promotion. This implies that
feed suppliers receive a premium of between 10% and 59% on the incremental dol-
lar invested. That some mill operators question benefits may mean that non-media
promotion is less effective than managers assume, an issue that can be resolved only
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a Elasticities for M* and NM* are not reported to save space.
8 The tax rate was lowered from $6 to $5 per ton in 1995 in order to achieve 100% participation by feed
mills. To the extent that the $6 tax was sub-optimal to begin with, this underscores Nerlove and Waugh’s
(1961) point (see footnote 7) that any purely economic theory of generic (cooperative) advertising can
only set an upper bound to optimal expenditures (as perceived by producers).Upstream Effects of Generic Advertising 97
Welfare Analysis
To sharpen results, and to quantify distributional impacts, we measured the effects
of a 20% increase in the feed tax and advertising on producer surplus at the two
market levels. In so doing, we set β NM = 0.0075, a conservative estimate in light of
the near-even budget allocation, which implies managers believe that β NM ≈  β M =
0.0150. In addition, to identify the separate effects of the tax and advertising, we
treat advertising as exogenous. That is, equation (7′ ) is dropped from the system and
a new set of reduced-form elasticities is computed with A* treated as an exogenous
variable along with T*. This procedure tends to understate the actual advertising ef-
fect in that a 1% increase in the tax results in a more than 1% increase in the budget
due to enlarged feed output. However, as indicated previously, the induced budget
enlargement is negligible, so the understatement should be innocuous. Short-run ef-
fects are measured by setting ε F = ε K = 0.
In measuring welfare effects in a vertical market setting, it is important to inter-
pret the “consumer” and “producer” surpluses correctly to avoid double counting
[Just, Hueth, and Schmitz 1982). The problem is well stated by Alston, Norton, and
Pardey (1995, p. 210) in connection with measuring returns to agricultural research:
The measurement of total benefits is not affected by the choice of where to
measure the benefits in the marketing chain—the total producer and consumer
surplus (or total change in surplus) is the same at all market levels. What is af-
fected by this choice is whose benefits are included in producer surplus and
whose are included in consumer surplus.
When research benefits are measured at the retail level, producer surplus in-
cludes quasi-rents to all factors employed in producing the retail product (in-
cluding marketing, distribution, and processing that takes place beyond the
farm level) as well as quasi-rents to farming inputs; consumer surplus measures
the surplus of consumers who buy at retail. When research benefits are mea-
sured at the farm level, producer surplus includes only the quasi-rents accruing
to inputs used in farming; quasi-rents accruing to off-farm processing and mar-
keting inputs are included along with final consumer surplus in “consumer sur-
plus” measured at the farm level.
With this in mind, and assuming parallel shifts, we measured advertising’s total
welfare impact by reference to the farm market using the following equations:
Ad Effect:
∆ CS PQ P Q Q
A =− + () ( ) ** α 1 1
2 (24)
Table 4
Effect of a 20% ($1 per ton) Increase in the Feed Tax and Induced
Advertising Expenditure on Feed Price, U.S. Catfish Industry, 1997–99
Parameter Value Percentage Effecta Initial Price Increase Net Gain
β NM = 0.0150 0.690 230 1.59 0.59
β NM = 0.0075 0.582 230 1.34 0.34
β NM = 0.0000 0.477 230 1.10 0.10
a Obtained by multiplying the coefficients for PF
*/T* in table 3 by 20%.Kinnucan and Paudel 98
∆ PS PQP Q Q
A =+ ** () 1 1
2 (25)





where α  represents the vertical shift in the farm-level demand curve due to the ad-
vertising increase, and  ∆∆ CS PS Q
A
Q
A ,,  and ∆ TSA represent the associated changes in
consumer, producer, and total surplus. Here we interpret “consumer” surplus as re-
ferring to the processing sector, since in our model the value chain is truncated at
the farm gate. As for producer surplus, equation (25) is properly interpreted as mea-
suring the quasi-rents that accrue to inputs used in farming, and, as such, is an ag-
gregate measure.
To disentangle the input-specific effects of the advertising, we decompose equa-
tion (25) as follows:
∆ PS P FP F F
A
FF =+ ** () 1 1
2 (25a)
∆ PS P KP K K
A
KK =+ ** () 1 1
2 (25b)






where  ∆ PSF
A measures the quasi-rent that accrues to the feed input, and ∆ PSK
A mea-
sures the quasi-rent that accrues to non-feed inputs. Thus, the total welfare impact of
the advertising increase and its distribution across the processing, feed, and non-
feed sectors are given by equations (24), (25a) and (25b).
Turning to the feed tax, we measured its total welfare impact by reference to the
feed market using the following equations:
Tax Effect:
∆ CS P FP F F
T
FF =− + ** () 1 1
2 (27)
∆ PS P F P F F
T
FF F =− + () () ** κ 1 1
2 (28)





where κ F represents the vertical shift in the feed supply curve due to the tax in-
crease,  ∆∆ CS PS F
T
F
T ,,  and ∆ TST represent the associated changes in consumer, pro-
ducer, and total surplus. Here, producer surplus refers to the tax’s impact on the feed
sector, since the measurement is taken at the feed level. By the same token, “con-
sumer surplus,” being measured at the feed level, is an aggregate measure that re-
flects the tax’s effect on the non-feed sector, and its effect on downstream “consum-
ers” (= processors in our model).
In particular, equation (27) may be decomposed as follows (see Alston, Norton,
and Pardey, 1995, p. 240):
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where  ∆ CSQ
T is the loss in the processor sector due to the tax increase, and ∆ PSK
T  is
the tax-induced externality in the non-feed sector. Thus, the processor impact can be
extracted from equation (27) as follows:






where the externality is measured as follows:
∆ PS P KP K K
T
KK =+ ** () . 1 1
2 (27c)
Since equation (27) measures the portion of the feed tax shifted to the farm level, if
the feed tax generates a positive externality in the non-feed sector; i.e.,  ∆ PSK
T > 0 in
equation (27c), this appears as a negative externality in the processor sector, i.e.,
equation (27b) becomes more negative. Thus, there is no free lunch.
Equations (27b) and (27c), combined with (28), constitute the tax’s total effect
and its distribution across the processing, feed, and non-feed sectors. These equa-
tions, combined with equations (24), (25a) and (25b), permit a sector-wide analysis
of the tax/promotion scheme that avoids double counting.
Values for the asterisked variables in equations (24)-(28) are computed by mul-
tiplying the reduced-form elasticities corresponding to T* and A* by 0.20, the rela-
tive change in A and T. The vertical shift parameters in equations (24) and (28) are
defined as follows:
αβ η κ τ == () . ** AT FF and
Setting β  = 0.0225, η  = 0.45 (baseline values for these parameters), and A* = 0.20
yields α  = 0.010. Thus, a 20% increase in advertising shifts the farm-level demand
curve up by 1.0% from its initial equilibrium point. Similarly, setting τ F = 0.022 (the
initial tax rate) and T* = 0.20 yields κ F = 0.0044. Thus, a 20% increase in the feed
tax shifts the feed supply curve up by 0.44% from the initial equilibrium point.
Welfare measures based on the foregoing formulas indicate that all sectors ben-
efit from the tax/promotion increase with one exception (table 5). That exception is
in a short-run situation where input supplies are fixed, in which case the effect on
the processing sector is nil. The reason is that with fixed input supplies, the farm
price rises by the full amount of the farm-level demand shift, leaving no economic
surplus to distribute to processors. Although processors receive no benefits from ad-
vertising in this situation, neither do they bear any cost, as the tax’s full burden is
borne by the feed sector when feed supply is fixed.
The big winner when input supplies are fixed is the non-feed sector, which
bears none of the advertising cost but enjoys benefits due to the advertising-induced
demand shift. Specifically, the short-run net gain to the non-feed sector is $6.9 mil-
lion, compared to $3.1 million for the feed sector. The tax increase enlarges the ad-
vertising budget by $2.4 million, with feed suppliers bearing the full cost due to the
perfectly inelastic supply. Despite bearing all the cost, the feed sector enjoys a
short-term Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) of 2.3:1, which compares to the sector-wide,
short-term BCR of 5.2:1. Overall, the short-run net benefit of the intensified promo-
tion effort across all sectors is $10.0 million, with 31% accruing to the feed sector
and 69% to the non-feed sector.
Turning to long-run impacts, the sector-wide net benefit remains constant at
$10.0 million, which reflects the principle that changes in supply and demand elas-
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sector, with a net gain of $5.1 million, supplants the non-feed sector as the
program’s major beneficiary. The reason is that the feed and non-feed sectors suffer
from rent dissipation. Rent dissipation, discussed in detail in Kinnucan, Nelson, and
Xiao (1995), occurs as supply response erodes the initial gains from the demand
shifts. In the present case, net gains in the feed sector decline from $3.1 million to
$0.8 million (76%), and in the non-feed sector from $6.9 million to $4.2 million
(39%).
That the non-feed sector experiences less rent dissipation is due to that sector’s
inelastic supply response (ε K = 0.26 compared to ε F = 1.58), but also to a tax-in-
duced externality. In particular, the higher price for feed associated with the elevated
feed tax increases the demand for non-feed inputs (since σ  > η ), which confers a
gain to the non-feed sector equal to $1.1 million. Consequently, the non-feed sector
enjoys a double free ride: once from the promotion, and again from the tax.
Because feed demand is less elastic than feed supply in the long-run, most of
the advertising cost (62%) is shifted to farmers, and thence to processors.9 Thus, de-
spite the large rent dissipation in this market, the feed sector’s long-run BCR remains
positive at 1.8:1, not as large as in the short run, but still favorable. Overall, about half
($4.9 million) of the total long-term net benefits from program intensification ac-
crue to factors, with the remainder ($5.1 million) going to the processing sector.
Sensitivity analysis was performed by setting σ  and ε K to alternative values as
indicated in table 6. Reducing σ  from its baseline value towards zero redistributes
surplus away from the processing and feed sectors in favor of the non-feed sector.
Table 5
Distributional Impacts of a 20% Increase in the Feed Tax
and Advertising Expenditure, U.S. Catfish Industry, 1997–99
Item Tax Effect Ad Effect Net Effect B-C Ratioa
Short Run:b                (— Million Dollars —)
Processing sector (∆ CSQ) 0.00 0.00 0.00 —
Feed sector (∆ PSF) –2.39 5.44 3.05 2.27
Non-feed sector (∆ PSK) 0.00 6.92 6.92 —
Total effect(∆ TS)c –2.39 12.36 9.97 5.17
Long Run:
Processing sector (∆ CSQ) –2.59 7.65 5.06 2.96
Feed sector (∆ PSF) –0.92 1.68 0.76 1.83
Non-feed sector (∆ PSK) 1.12 3.05 4.16 —
Total effect (∆ TS)c –2.39 12.38 9.99 5.18
Note: Results are based on β NM = 0.0075. Totals may not sum exactly due to rounding error.
a Advertising effect divided by absolute value of tax effect.
b Short-run effects are measured by setting supply elasticities to zero; i.e., ε F = ε K = 0.
c ∆ TS = ∆ CSQ + ∆ PSF + ∆ PSK.
9 Feed suppliers’ incidence is given by Ω F = η F/(ε F + η F), where η F = (ε Kλ  + ση )/(ε K + SFσ  + SKη ) is the
total feed demand elasticity (see appendix). Substituting parameter values from table 1 yields η F = 0.99,
which is less than ε F = 1.58, and implies Ω F = 0.38. Thus, in the long run 62% ($1.5 million) of the
advertising cost is shifted to farmers, which is ultimately shifted to processors in the form of higher
prices for live catfish. For further discussion of the tax shifting issue, and its importance to promotion
incentives, see Kinnucan (1999) and Kinnucan and Myrland (2000).Upstream Effects of Generic Advertising 101
However, the redistribution is modest. For example, reducing σ  from 1.0 to 0.10
causes the long-term net quasi-rent accruing to the non-feed sector to rise from $4.3
to $4.5 million, a mere 5%. Thus, results are robust to this parameter. This is true
despite the fact that the feed tax generates a negative externality for the non-feed
sector when σ  < η  (compare simulations 1 and 2). Reducing ε K from its baseline
value to zero also redistributes surplus in favor of the non-feed sector, as might be
expected since rent dissipation goes to zero as the input supply curve rotates to the
vertical position. Here results are somewhat more sensitive, as the feed sector’s net
surplus increases from $4.3 million to $6.0 as ε K decreases from 0.26 to zero (com-
pare simulations 1 and 3). In the extreme case where σ  = 0.10 and ε K = 0, virtually
all of the net benefit ($8.8 million or 88% of the total) is captured by the non-feed
sector (simulation 4). But even here, thanks to tax shifting, and the fact that the tax’s
impact on the non-feed sector is now negative, which reduces the tax’s cost to the
processing sector, the BCR remains favorable across all sectors.
Farmers’ Impact
A common critique of farm programs is that the benefits are capitalized into land
values, which implies that the major beneficiaries are initial landowners; i.e., those
who owned land suitable for farming when the programs were installed. A similar
Table 6
Sensitivity of Welfare Measures to Non-Feed Supply Elasticity (ε K)
and Factor Substitution Elasticity (σ ), U.S. Catfish Industry, 1997–99
Elasticity Valuesa Tax Effect Ad Effect Net Effect B-C Ratio
Simulation 1: σ  = 1.0, ε K = 0.26:                (— Million Dollars —)
Processing sector –2.21 7.20 4.99 3.25
Feed sector –0.72 1.44 0.72 2.00
Non-feed sector 0.54 3.74 4.28 —
Simulation 2: σ  = 0.1, ε K = 0.26:
Processing sector –1.37 6.19 4.81 4.50
Feed sector –0.27 0.89 0.62 3.32
Non-feed sector –0.75 5.29 4.54 7.07
Simulation 3: σ  = 1.0, ε K = 0:
Processing sector –2.45 5.57 3.13 2.28
Feed sector –0.70 1.59 0.89 2.28
Non-feed sector 0.75 5.21 5.96 —
Simulation 4: σ  = 0.1, ε K = 0:
Processing sector –0.74 1.68 0.94 2.28
Feed sector –0.21 0.48 0.27 2.27
Non-feed sector –1.45 10.21 8.76 7.06
Note: Totals may not sum exactly due to rounding error.
a Remaining parameters are set to baseline values given in table 1 with β NM = 0.0075.Kinnucan and Paudel 102
critique applies to commodity promotion. In particular, the major beneficiaries of
generic advertising schemes are the owners of fixed assets when the program was
initiated (1987 in the case of catfish). New entrants receive little or no benefits in
that they must pay higher prices for land and other fixed factors that appreciated in
value due to the advertising. Moreover, new entrants must continue to pay the tax,
or watch their asset values decline with the subsequent reductions in advertising.
With the foregoing in mind, we computed the farmers’ return to the tax/promo-
tion increase using the following formulas:
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where the Wi (i = Q, F, K) represent the portion of fixed assets in the processing,
feed, and non-feed sectors owned by farmers. Equation (30a) is a generalized
“profit” function that takes into account vertical integration. For example, catfish farm-
ers have significant ownership interest in the feed and processing sectors, and thus the
net surplus that accrues to these sectors is properly credited to farmers on a pro rata
basis. The “integration weights” in equation (30a) permit such an accounting.
Equation (30b) measures farmers’ “profit” by comparing the gain in producer
surplus associated with the advertising with the loss in producer surplus associated
with the tax, both measured at the farm level. As such, equation (30b) represents the
conventional measure of farmers’ net returns commonly found in the literature.
Thus, there is some interest in knowing how the conventional measure compares
with our more refined measure. The ∆ PSQ
A term in equation (30b) is measured using
equation (25). To measure ∆ PSQ
T  we use the equation:
∆Ω PS PQ P Q Q
T
F =−+ () ( ) ** κ 1 1
2 (31)
where Ω  is the previously defined incidence parameter. For the baseline values
given in table 1, Ω  = 0.77, which means that the feed tax in the long run causes the
farm supply curve to shift up by 77% of the vertical distance of the feed supply
curve.
In applying the formulas, we focus on long-run returns (as defined in table 5)
and retain the hypothesis that non-media promotion is half as effective as media pro-
motion. Discussions with industry experts indicated that farmer-owned mills or co-
operatives accounted for at least 90% of feed production. Owing to complicating
factors such as joint ventures, farmers’ ownership of processing capacity was more
difficult to assess, but 30% was suggested as a “ballpark” figure. Accordingly, and
with the added assumption that 90% of the non-feed inputs represent land, ponds,
and other durable equipment owned by catfish producers, we set WQ = 0.30, WF =
WK = 0.90 to obtain a “best-bet” return. However, to assess vertical integration’s role
in determining farm profits, we ran additional simulations with WQ and WF alterna-
tively set to zero.
Results based on equation (30a) suggest that farmers capture the majority of the
net surplus generated by the tax/promotion increase (table 7). In particular, for best-
bet parameter values farmers receive an estimated net gain of $6.0 million, which is
equal to 60% of the sector-wide benefit. Both upstream and downstream integration
contribute to this gain, with greater importance given to downstream integration.
Specifically, using the “no integration” scenario as a baseline, integration into pro-
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compared to $4.4 million (5% gain) for integration into feed production. Overall,
vertical integration boosts farmer’s profit by $1.8 million, equal to 30% of the real-
ized net gain. Thanks to tax shifting and the positive externality that accrues to non-
feed inputs (e.g., farmers’ land) due to the feed tax, farmers enjoy a long-term BCR
of 10.9:1, according to our best-bet estimate.
By way of comparison, equation (30b) implies a farmers’ BCR of 3.4:1, a favor-
able return, but considerably less than that indicated by the refined measure. The un-
derstatement is due to equation (30b)’s failure to account for farmers’ integration
into processing, but also to a more fundamental flaw. In particular, equation (30b)
does not take into account the positive externality that accrues to the non-feed input,
nor does it reflect the extent to which the tax is passed onto processors. Each of
these factors has the effect of reducing the farmers’ cost of the tax scheme. In fact,
in the absence of combined integration into the processing and feed sectors, the tax
scheme actually yields to farmers a net benefit (table 7, rows 2-4). The reason is that
the positive externality ($1.1 million) enjoyed by the non-feed input more than off-
sets the welfare loss ($0.9 million) in the feed sector (see table 5, long-run esti-
mates). The upshot is that profit measures that fail to take into account the tax
scheme’s general-equilibrium effects can be misleading with respect to the actual
farmer impacts of the promotion effort.
Concluding Comments
This research’s basic premise is that upstream effects can be important when evalu-
ating returns to commodity promotion. In the case of catfish, study results suggest
that about half of the net benefits generated by the program accrue to the inputs used
in catfish production. Thus, inappropriate accounting of the factor-specific effects of
the tax/promotion scheme could cause return estimates to be distorted, especially in
relation to distributional impacts. For example, failure to account for the positive ef-
fect of the feed tax on the value of non-feed inputs (e.g., farmers’ land) would have
caused farmers’ returns to the catfish promotion scheme to be seriously understated.
Table 7
Farmers’ Return to Generic Advertising, U.S. Catfish Industry, 1997–99
Scenarioa Benefit Cost Net Gain B-C Ratio
(— Million Dollars —)
Full integrationb
(WQ = 0.3; WF = WK = 0.9) 6.55 –0.60 5.95 10.94
Processing only
(WQ = 0.3; WF = 0, WK = 0.9) 5.04 0.23 5.27 —
Feed only
(WQ = 0; WF = WK = 0.9) 4.25 0.18 4.43 —
No integration
(WQ = WF = 0; WK = 0.9) 3.05 1.12 4.16 —
Conventional measurec 4.92 –1.47 3.45 3.35
Note: The total (sector-wide) net surplus generated by the tax/promotion increase is $10 million.
a See text for details. Estimates refer to long-run returns and are based on the assumption that non-media
advertising is half as effective as media advertising; i.e., β M = 0.0150 and β NM = 0.0075.
b “Best-bet” estimate.
c Based on text equation (30b).Kinnucan and Paudel 104
Whether similar hidden benefits (from the farmer’s perspective) exist for other pro-
grams is an open question. Clearly, by including upstream impacts, it is possible to
obtain a more complete picture of costs and benefits.
A new result is that a feed tax is an inferior funding mechanism from the
farmer’s perspective. That is, a feed tax, in general, fails to generate the budget
needed to maximize producer surplus at the farm level. This, coupled with the fact
that assessments must be kept low enough to attract majority support, explains why
program funding is below the economic optimum. Still, a feed tax has certain advan-
tages, such as funding stability and lower transactions cost, which were not consid-
ered in this study. Whether these advantages outweigh the advantages of the higher
funding levels that might accrue from a production tax is an empirical issue. The
benefit-cost ratios provided in this study serve as a basis for assessing such
tradeoffs.
A caveat in interpreting our results is that effectiveness of the industry’s non-
media promotion is unknown. We dealt with this uncertainty by entertaining alterna-
tive scenarios about likely impact. Although this seems a reasonable way to proceed,
the results are conditional on which, if any, of the scenarios is correct. Clearly, em-
pirical research is needed to test our elasticity assumptions. In the meantime, study
results showing that the program is underfunded, even in the face of a zero impact
for non-media promotion, suggest that basic conclusions are robust. That is, an in-
crease in the feed tax is likely to be welfare increasing for all industry participants,
especially if the extra funds are invested in media advertising, the one program ele-
ment where reliable estimates of consumer response are available.
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Appendix
Farmer’s Incidence of Feed Tax
To derive farmers’ incidence when farm price is endogenous, we begin by deriving
feed suppliers’ incidence. For this purpose, let:
′ =− PP T FF (A.1)
where  ′ P F is the net feed price; i.e., the price after the tax has been deducted. Taking
the total differential of equation (A.1) with respect to tax yields:
dP dT dP dT FF ′ =− 1
which may be written equivalently as:
dP dT P T FF F ′ = [] − − τ 1 1 ** (A.2)
where PF
*/T* is the reduced-form elasticity of the gross (tax inclusive) feed price
with respect to the feed tax. This elasticity may be obtained by first setting A* = ψ * = 0
(to isolate the tax effect) and rewriting the feed demand curve [text equation (10)] as
follows:
FP T FF T
** * =− − ηη (A.3)
where:
ηε λ σ η ε ση FK K FK SS =+ + + () ( )
is the total demand elasticity for feed, and η T is tax elasticity as defined in equation
(10). Dropping the η T T* term (to avoid double counting, see footnote 3), and substi-
tuting equation (A.3) into text equation (5′ ), yields:
PT FF F F F
** () =+ τε ε η
which indicates the net effect of an isolated increase in the feed tax on the gross
price of feed, holding constant advertising expenditure. Substituting this relation-
ship into equation (A.2), yields:
dP dT FF F F ′ =+ − εε η () 1
or, more simply:
dP dT FF F F ′ =− + ηη ε () . (A.4)
From equation (A.4), if feed supply is perfectly inelastic (ε F = 0), or feed de-
mand is perfectly elastic (η F = ∞ ),  dP dT F′  = –1. In these cases, the net feed price
declines by the full amount of the tax; i.e., feed suppliers’ incidence is 100%. Con-
versely, if feed supply is perfectly elastic (ε F = ∞ ), or feed demand is perfectly in-Upstream Effects of Generic Advertising 107
elastic (η F = 0), dP dT F′  = 0. In these cases, the net feed price is unaffected by the
tax and pass-through is complete; i.e., feed suppliers’ incidence is zero. Denoting Ω F
=  dP dT F′ , equation (A.4) can thus be rewritten as:
Ω FF F F =+ ηη ε () (A.5)
where Ω F is feed suppliers’ tax incidence.
Since the portion of the tax not borne by feed suppliers is shifted to farmers, it
follows that:
ΩΩ QF += 1
where Ω Q is farmers’ incidence. Substituting equation (A.5) into the above expres-
sion and simplifying gives:
Ω QF FF =+ εε η () (A.6)
which is the desired expression for farmers’ incidence of the feed tax.
The importance of the non-feed supply elasticity in determining farmers’ inci-
dence can perhaps be best appreciated by noting that when ε K = 0, the total feed de-
mand elasticity reduces to:
′ =+ ησ η σ η FF K SS () .
In this instance, farmers’ incidence is 100%; i.e., Ω Q = 1, if either η  or σ  is zero. By
contrast, if ε K > 0 (the general case), both η  and σ  have to be zero for farmers’ inci-
dence to be 100%. Finally, it should be noted that the feed tax ultimately is shifted
to consumers in the form of higher prices for catfish. Thus, Ω Q may alternatively be
interpreted as processor incidence, since in our model the value chain is truncated at
the farm gate.